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The Unraveling of the Shanghai “Deal”:
US-China Trade-cum-Currency Conflict 
comes to Europe by Shahin Vallée
The trade conflict between the US and China has now clearly escalated into the currency 
realm. This will force Europe to respond to avert being the “variable of adjustment” for 
an economic conflict from which it cannot remain an innocent bystander.
Last Thursday, US-President Trump announced levies of 10 
percent on a further $300 billion in US imports from Chi-
na effective on September 1, 2019. This was prompted by a 
collapse of the US-Chinese trade discussions in Shanghai 
last week. The new tariffs will bring all of the US’s $509 
billion in imports from China to some level of tariff. China 
has imposed levies of its own on 85 percent of its imports 
from the US and is likely to also add tariffs on the remain-
ing imports worth $20 billion. More importantly, China 
will undoubtedly explore additional ways to respond to 
further escalation in trade tensions from the US. 
China has several options. It can reinstate US automo-
bile tariffs that it had lifted in December 2018 as a gesture 
of goodwill. It can also further cut imports of agricultural 
goods from the US and impose tariffs on oil and gas 
imports – which would incidentally increase its demand 
from Iran. More consequential for the world, China can 
use the exchange rate to alleviate the pressure created by 
US tariffs on its economy. It has already started to do so 
by letting the USD/CNY exchange rate surge through 7.0, 
but this is likely to only be the beginning. 
The transformation of this so far bilateral trade conflict 
into a currency conflict has far-reaching consequences 
for the world. By weakening its exchange rate, China is 
spreading the cost of US tariffs onto the rest of the world 
and is, hence, internationalizing the conflict. This will 
force other countries to take measures to limit the spill-
overs: fiscal and monetary reactions by other players 
will likely follow. A recent paper finds that trade tariffs 
have more effects on import/export elasticities than FX 
movements, and therefore, devaluations need to be large 
to offset rather small tariffs. It concludes, for example, 
that a 14 percent depreciation of the renminbi against the 
US Dollar would be necessary to erase the effect of a 5 
percentage point average increase in US import tariffs in 
order to achieve a given trade deficit.
From Trade to Currency
The effective devaluation of the CNY required to offset 
further American tariffs could therefore be very substan-
tial and would provoke a realignment of global exchange 
rates, with substantial appreciation of the Euro and the 
Yen. Indeed, since February 2016, the global exchange 
rate markets operate under an untold framework agreed 
on the meeting of the G20 Summit of Finance Ministers 
in Shanghai. After the shock CNY devaluation of August 
2015 that unleashed destabilizing capital flight from 
China and accelerated the appreciation of the USD, the 
Federal Reserve had tacitly agreed to delay its tightening 
cycle provided China also contained depreciation forces 
weighing on the CNY through a mix of interventions and 
capital controls. This basic agreement has largely held 
with the Powell Federal Reserve, which has remained 
quite sensitive to movement in the Dollar and insistent 
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along with the US Treasury and US Trade Representative 
on China limiting depreciation of the CNY. Japan and the 
Euro Area have been great indirect beneficiaries of this 
Sino-American understanding, which has contributed to 
policing exchange rate volatility and capital flows since 
then. This is now unravelling with serious consequences 
for the world and especially for those surplus countries 
that had been hitching a free ride on the Shanghai „deal“.
The intensification of the trade-cum-currency conflict 
would inevitably force countries with the most currency 
appreciation potential to shoulder a greater part of the 
burden of the adjustment between the US and China. In 
addition, these adjustment efforts might well increase as 
the US president himself weighs in, intensifying pres-
sure on the Federal Reserve (maybe up to the point of 
removing its chairman and even contemplating cur-
rency intervention). President Trump’s rhetoric against 
recent policy decisions by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) suggests that the US administration is alert and 
prepared to also export the currency discussions beyond 
China. The recent G20 meetings and the G7 meeting of 
Finance Ministers and Central Bankers in Chantilly have 
made every effort to avoid this sensitive topic by sticking 
to their previous (but vague) commitments on exchange 
rates, but this will be insufficient to address the break-
down of the Shanghai truce. 
These issues are liable to erupt or form the background 
to the G7 meeting in Biarritz at the end of August. They 
are also going to be more central to debates around 
economic policy coordination in Europe. In the event of 
a real escalation, the Euro Area would have to achieve 
monetary financed fiscal expansion of a sufficient scale in 
order to avert a substantial increase in the EUR real effec-
tive exchange rate that would further diminish inflation 
expectations and growth. The only way to achieve this 
would be a significant and coordinated fiscal expansion 
(say to the tune of 1 percent of the Euro Area’s GDP) al-
lowing the ECB to resume its quantitative easing program 
in response to the deflationary impulse provoked by the 
escalation of the trade-cum-currency conflict.
External and Internal Coordination
But despite the well-founded warnings by the OECD and a 
few lone voices in Europe, these policy debates have bare-
ly started. Both Germany and the EU are constrained by 
fiscal rules that would need to be revisited in a scenario 
where both the currency and the economy may come un-
der such pressure. Meanwhile, France continues to game 
the fiscal rules but stays shy of launching a discussion on 
the needed reforms of the fiscal framework or on the need 
for coordinated fiscal expansion. Finally, the ECB keeps 
on demanding more fiscal accommodation, but refrains 
from saying explicitly by how much and from which coun-
try. If the Euro Area cannot achieve internal economic 
policy coordination, the Euro will become the external 
variable of adjustment of the US trade currency-cum-
conflict. It is high time that the Europeans start thinking 
about the dear external costs (for them and the for the 
world economy) of their poor internal policy coordination. 
China and the US might force them to, and the G7 meet-
ing in Biarritz on August 24 is a good place to start.
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